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Michael Otsuka writes, 
John Taurek…has famously argued that, when faced with the choice 
between saving one stranger’s life and two…different strangers’ lives, we 
should follow a principle that directs us to flip a fair coin to determine whom 
to save… ((2000): 288) 
 
Kenneth Walden writes, 
Taurek argues…[w]e must…give each person the greatest possible chance of 
being rescued consistent with everyone having the same chance.  ((2014): 
232) 
 
Ben Bradley writes, 
Taurek argued that when deciding what to do in such a situation, you should 
flip a coin… ((2009): 1) 
 
Gerald Lang and Rob Lawlor write,  
John Taurek argued that, in conflict cases, where we can save one group or 
another group…but cannot save everyone, we should determine whom to 
save by flipping an unbiased coin… ((2013): 1)  
 
When they write these things, they agree with many others.2 All of them, I think, mistake 
what Taurek is saying. Taurek holds that the rescuer should save one group but may save 
either. He does not hold that there is a requirement to give everyone an equal, maximal 
chance at being saved before doing any saving. There is a four-part case for thinking so: 
Firstly, none of Taurek’s arguments for the conclusion that it is permissible to save 
either group leads straight to the conclusion that one must give equal, maximal chances; in 
some cases they militate against that conclusion. 
Secondly, getting to the conclusion about chances from Taurek’s arguments requires 
imputing to him premises he never asserts. 
Thirdly, the conclusion about chances is itself something Taurek never asserts. 
Instead, he asserts that he would flip a coin to decide whether to save the many or the few. 
Finally, the would-conclusion is consonant with Taurek’s motivation to work out 
what to do in many-few cases; the should-conclusion is not so consonant. 
So the conclusion of Taurek’s argument is commonly misinterpreted. The 
misinterpretation obscures Taurek’s main conclusion. It also makes his arguments less 
plausible. But it raises a series of important questions. 
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1 Elizabeth Harman and an anonymous reviewer for The Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy improved this 
paper.  Thanks to both. 
2 Among others, they agree with Hirose (2001): 341; Hirose (2013): 182; Lawlor (2006): 150; Rasmussen (2012): 
206; and Sanders (1988): 4. 
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Consider Keith and Leon, strangers to you, drowning there. Maria, another stranger, is 
drowning here. They are all lovely people, equally lovely people. You can save both Keith 
and Leon or can save Maria, but you can’t save all three. What should you do? 
Taurek assumes3 you are required to save either the many—all of them—or the few. 
He holds that it is a permissible outcome to save either group and argues variously for that 
conclusion. One argument is about someone you know and like. To see it, modify the Keith, 
et al case so that although Keith and Leon are strangers to you, you know and like Maria. 
About such a case, Taurek argues: 
(P1) If there were a requirement to save the many in the original Keith, Leon, 
Maria case, it would not be permissible to save Maria in the modified case. 
(P2) Saving Maria in the modified case is permissible.  Hence, 
(P3) There is no requirement to save the many in the original case.   
(P4) If there is no requirement to save the many, it is permissible to save 
either group in the original case.  Hence, 
(C1) It is permissible to save either group in the original case. (295-296) 
 
The conclusion here is not that you are required to give chances. In the case in which you 
know and like Maria, there is no need to give everyone chances. Yet that case, Taurek thinks, 
is not morally importantly different from the case in which Keith, Leon, and Maria are 
strangers. So not only is Taurek’s conclusion here not that there is a requirement to give 
chances, but the case that motivates the argument militates against that conclusion. 
 Now modify the case so that you are out of the picture. Maria can save herself or 
Leon and Keith. What may she do? Taurek argues: 
(P5) It’s permissible for Maria to save herself. 
(P6) If it is permissible for Maria to save herself, it is permissible because it is 
permissible for Maria to take an interest in her own survival. 
(P7) If so, it is permissible for a stranger to take an interest in her own 
survival. 
(P8) If it is permissible for a stranger to take an interest in Maria’s survival, it 
is permissible for the stranger to save her on that ground. Hence, 
(P9) It is permissible to save Maria in the original case. 
(P10) It is also permissible to save Leon and Keith in the original case. 
Hence, 
(C1) It is permissible to save either group in the original case. (301) 
 
Again—plausibly or not—Taurek sees no important difference between the case in which 
Maria can save herself and our original case. So not only is the conclusion not that there is a 
requirement to give chances but, again, the case that motivates the argument militates against 
that conclusion. 
 Finally, most notoriously, Taurek argues, 
(P11) It is no better to save the many than the few. 
(P12) If it is no better to save the many than the few, then, unless there is 
some other morally relevant difference between saving the many and the few, 
it is permissible to save either group. 
(P13) There is no such morally relevant difference.  Hence, 
(C1) It is permissible to save either group in the original case. (304-307) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Taurek (1978): 293, fn. 1. Unless otherwise noted, all page numbers refer to this paper.	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Again, the conclusion is not that you are required to give chances.  
 
2. 
So why interpret Taurek as holding you should give chances? Taurek writes, 
I cannot save everyone.  Why not give each person an equal chance to 
survive?...Where such an option is open to me it would seem to best express 
my equal concern and respect for each person. (303) 
 
And writes, 
I have absolutely no reason to [save the many rather than few or few rather 
than many]. Thus I am inclined to treat each person equally by giving an 
equal chance to survive. (306) 
 
These might be interpreted as claiming that one should flip a coin. But “Why not give each 
person an equal chance?” and “I am inclined to…[give]…equal chance[s]” are odd, weak 
ways of saying one should. 
The passages might also be interpreted as claiming that one should have and express 
equal concern. But “I am inclined to treat each person equally” is an odd, weak way of saying 
one should treat people equally. 
Instead, I think, in these passages Taurek tells the reader what he would do if he 
were the rescuer. He would flip if he were you, deciding between Keith, Leon, and Maria. Of 
a case in which his choice is between one and five, he writes, 
I feel compelled to deny that any third party, relevant special obligations 
apart, would be morally required to save the five…and let [the one] die.  So 
what do I think one should do in such a situation in the absence of any 
special concern for any of the parties involved? 
First, let me suggest what I would do in many such cases. (303; emphasis on 
“would” is mine) 
 
He starts with a moral question—what should the rescuer do?—and ends with a claim about 
what he would do. He repeats the would-claim later: 
I can hear the incredulous tones: ‘Would you flip a coin were it a question of 
saving fifty persons or saving one?...’ 
I would... (306; emphases mine) 
 
He is not saying one should flip a coin, just that he would. In nearby passages, he 
distinguishes moral claims—claims about obligations or what is permissible—from claims 
about what he would do. Of a case in which he knows and likes David, the few, he writes, 
…I would act to save David’s life because, knowing him and liking him, my 
concern for his well-being is simply greater than my concern for the well-
being of those others, not because I recognize some overriding obligation to 
him… (297; my emphases) 
 
Of a choice between B and C, he writes, 
It must be permissible for me…to choose the outcome that is in B’s best 
interest.  And, of course, this is what I would do if B’s welfare were more 
important to me than C’s. (302; my emphases) 
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So while he clearly distinguishes moral claims from claims about what he would do in these 
two passages, the case for thinking he should flip a coin has it that Taurek failed to distinguish 
in crucial passages, that he wrote “would” when he meant “should” in crucial passages. Why 
think he slipped like this? 
 
3. 
In rescue cases, Taurek’s arguments require him to save some group, permit him to save 
either, but give no guidance about how to make the decision. It is clear that he holds there 
are some ways of wrongly making the decision: picking the richest or the smartest. Doing so 
would wrong the less rich or the less smart.4 The coin flip ensures that no one is wronged 
and everyone knows that and, hence, can’t reasonably complain. Yet so far as there are other 
ways to avoid invidious decision-making, Taurek has no objection to them. 
All this makes sense against the background of Taurek’s interest in cases like Keith, 
Leon, and Maria’s. Frances Kamm writes, 
I was interested to learn from Taurek that his concern for whether the 
numbers count originally developed when he had to deal with a conflict 
among this children, to each of whom he said he was deeply attached. 
(Kamm (1993): 98, fn. 19) 
 
It would be an odd view of parenting to think that Taurek should give chances to his children 
when they disagree, that he does wrong if, for example, he plays eeny-meeny-miney-moe or 
picks the kid with the largest pancreas.5 Yet neither gives chances. Like giving chances, they 
guarantee that Taurek doesn’t pick a kid because she is the richest or smartest or...  
I have argued that Taurek holds that rescuers needn’t give victims chances. Yet 
maybe he should have gone for chances. Maybe that view is more plausible than the one I 
ascribe to him. Maybe the best reason to attribute the view to him is, well, it is not 
inconsistent with his text and is a lot more plausible than the view that one may save either 
group without giving chances. This raises a host of questions: What are chances? If they are 
a good, what is the metaphysical picture of what they are that renders that plausible? More 
generally, why are chances goods? Do decision-procedures other than chance-giving secure 
that good? Are victims owed such a good, such that you do wrong if you fail to provide them 
with those goods? These are important, interesting questions.6 If Taurek went for chances, 
he’d have had to wrestle with them. He didn’t. Maybe he should have. But he didn’t.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 314-315. Cf. Anscombe (1967) and Munoz-Dardé (2005). 
5 The latter example comes proximately from Wasserman (1996) and ultimately from Kornhauser and Sager 
(1988). 
6 They are discussed in the papers in Stone (2011). 
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